Mercer Law Review
Volume 50
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 12

7-1999

Labor Law
Stephen W. Mooney
Leigh Lawson Reeves

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mooney, Stephen W. and Reeves, Leigh Lawson (1999) "Labor Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 4 ,
Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol50/iss4/12

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Labor Law
by Stephen W. Mooney*
and
Leigh Lawson Reeves"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1998 decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that addressed issues in the areas of

traditional labor law. This article specifically discusses decisions by the
Eleventh

Circuit

under

the

Labor Management

Relations

Act

("LMRA"),' the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 2 the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA7),3 and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 4 As in the years past, the Eleventh

Circuit decided several cases that involved issues of interest in the area
of traditional labor law. Due to page limitations, however, this Article
cannot survey every relevant case. Thus, this Article focuses upon only
the noteworthy cases and the cases of first impression decided by the

Eleventh Circuit in 1998.

*

Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute
of Technology (B.S.I.M., 1983); Texas Tech University School of Law (J.D., 1987). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Texas.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1985); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1989-1991); Senior Managing Editor (1990-1991). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
The authors express their gratitude to Elizabeth Clarke for her extraordinary effort in
assisting in the preparation of this Article.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

A. Preemption of State Law Claims for Assault, Battery, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Peterson v. BMI Refractories,6 the main legal issue addressed by
the Eleventh Circuit was whether section 301(a) of the LMRA prevented
former employees' state law tort claims.' In this case, the Eleventh
Circuit held the LMRA did not preempt the state law claims for assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.7
Plaintiffs were black males employed as laborers at BMI's Birmingham, Alabama facility. Both men were members of the Laborers
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. During the period of
plaintiffs' employment, the union and BMI were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement that contained a grievance and arbitration
procedure. 8
Giangrosso, a white supervisor, was a major source of racial hostility
against plaintiffs in their workplace. The racial problems were not
simply limited to verbal abuse. Eventually, they escalated to the level
of violence and physical intimidation, including an incident when a black
laborer was kicked by a white brick mason and another incident when,
in Giangrosso's presence, the same brick mason threatened to throw one
of plaintiffs off of a fifty foot scaffold. Giangrosso's only response was
laughter.9
The situation came to a head when plaintiffs returned from lunch one
day and found a pallet of gunnite bags had been overturned near where
they had been working. When one of the plaintiffs leaned over to pick
up the bags, he was kicked from behind by Giangrosso. Later, during
that same shift, Giangrosso told plaintiffs to get in his truck with him.
Then, Giangrosso pulled a nine millimeter pistol out of the glove box and
pointed the gun in one of the plaintiff's general direction while saying,
"[Y]ou see this here, well, I just wanted you to see it, that's all."
Following this incident, plaintiffs returned to the job site, received their
final paychecks, and were fired. The reason given to plaintiffs was that
Giangrosso said they were no longer needed. 10

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

132 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
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The following day, plaintiffs went to their union office to file a
grievance in the matter. However, the union representative informed
plaintiffs that the union would not involve itself with their grievances,
even though the collective bargaining agreement contained articles that
addressed both nondiscrimination and grievances."
This action originally was filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama. BMI removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama and moved for summary
judgment on all counts. The magistrate judge assigned to the case
issued a report recommending that BMI's motion be granted on all
counts. The district court entered an order granting BMI's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the action in all respects without
prejudice. In entering its findings, the district court adopted the
magistrate's recommendations, but also determined that the state law
tort claims were preempted by the LMRA. Plaintiffs then filed a timely
notice of appeal. 2
Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in finding that their state
law claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress were preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. Section 301(a)
provides that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization may be brought in any district court having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties. 3
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the section 301(a) preemption issue
focused on whether the state tort claims "'confers nonnegotiable statelaw rights on employers or employees independent of any right
established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim
is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract. '""4 The court analyzed the elements of each challenged state
law claim to determine whether the claims required an interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. 5
The Eleventh Circuit first examined the state law claims for assault
and battery.'6 Here, the court rejected BMI's contention that adjudication of the merits of the claims required an interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement. 7 Instead, the court said the inquiry

11. Id. at 1409-10.
12. Id. at 1410.
13. Id. at 1412 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
14. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)).

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1413.
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was purely factual in nature and did not turn on any interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement.18 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
held that plaintiffs' "right to be free from assault and battery rests
firmly on a nonnegotiable state right."19 Thus, section 301(a) of the
LMRA did not preempt plaintiffs' state law claims for assault and
battery.2 °
The Eleventh Circuit also found the state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the LMRA.2"
Here, however, the court recognized that analysis of an employee's claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress could foreseeably require
interpretation of an employment contract or a collective bargaining
agreement.22 Nevertheless, the court found that the employer's conduct
in the instant case was so extreme and outrageous that examination of
the collective bargaining agreement was unnecessary because BMI's
conduct could not be arguably sanctioned by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.2 3 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held plaintiffs'
state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA.24
B. Preemption of State Law Claim for Tortious Interference with
Employment
The case of 7rner v. American Federation of Teachers Local 156525
also examined the preemption of a state law claim by the LMRA.
However, in this case, the Eleventh Circuit found the former employee's
state law claim for tortious interference
with employment was preempt26
ed by section 301(a) of the LMRA.
Here, plaintiff had been employed as a field representative by the
American Federation of Teachers Local 1565 ("AFT"). Her employment
contract with AFT was governed by the collective bargaining agreement
between AFT and the Atlanta Staff Union ("ASU"). In 1995 the
president of AFT fired plaintiff
for insubordination and involvement in
27
internal political activity.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
22.

Id.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 138 F.3d 878 (11th Cir. 1998).
26.

Id. at 884.

27. Id. at 880.
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Plaintiff filed suit against AFT in Georgia Superior Court, alleging
tortious interference with employment. She also alleged a violation of
the terms and conditions of her employment contract and defamation.
AFT removed the case to federal district court on the grounds that the
case involved a federal question, specifically, preemption by the LMRA.
After AFT moved for summary judgment, the district court granted
summary judgment for AFT on the contract claim. Similarly, the district
court also granted AFT summary judgment on the tortious interference
with employment claim because there was no interference by one who
was a stranger to the employment relationship. Plaintiff appealed the
district court's rulings on summary judgment of both the tortious
interference with employment claim and the contract claim.'
The Eleventh Circuit declined to follow the district court's decision to
resolve the tortious interference with employment claim under Georgia
law.' Rather, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether resolution of
the state law claim for tortious interference with employment turned on
an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.3 °
The Eleventh Circuit noted this circuit has not addressed this issue
directly, but that other circuits have ruled tortious interference with
employment claims necessarily require an examination of the terms of
the relevant collective bargaining agreement. 3'
Therefore, these
circuits have held tortious interference with employment claims are
preempted by the LMRA.32
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit found plaintiff's state law claim for
tortious interference with employment required an analysis of the
collective bargaining agreement.3" In plaintiff's case, analysis of the
collective bargaining agreement was particularly important because her
tortious interference claim rested solely on the theory of wrongful
discharge. Therefore, interpretation of whether the collective bargaining
agreement's terms precluded such action was paramount. Consequently,
the Eleventh Circuit found plaintiff's state law claim for tortious
interference with employment was preempted by section 301(a) of the
LMRA. 4

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 884 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884 n.14.
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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

A.

Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) Unfair Labor PracticesViolations
In National Labor Relations Board v. McClain of Georgia,Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of what is, and what is not,
considered to be an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the NLRA.36
Specifically, the court addressed whether the employer violated sections
8(a)(1) and (3) when it suddenly changed to a "zero tolerance" employee
drug testing policy from its previous position of leniency shortly after the
union filed its petition. 7 The court also examined whether employee
layoffs during the union campaign violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3).38
The Eleventh Circuit held both of the employer practices at issue were
NLRA violations.39
The company in this case manufactured solid waste containers and
employed approximately fifty employees, including several temporary
employees at its Macon, Georgia plant. In 1994 the company employees
attempted to unionize after the union filed a petition with the NLRB.
The NLRB dismissed the union's petition on the ground that it would
have to include the temporary workers in the bargaining unit.
Consequently, the union again filed a petition with the NLRB in 1995
including the temporary employees in the proposed bargaining unit.40
Seven days after the 1995 union petition was filed, the company
denied a temporary employee the opportunity to be retested following a
positive drug test and fired him. Several weeks later the company
ordered that all employees be drug tested. Seven employees tested
positive and were immediately fired. Four of the employees that were
fired had no known union connections. Prior to that time, the company
had been lenient in the enforcement of its drug testing policy. In fact,
the company's previous policy was to allow employees who tested
positive for drugs to be retested and to give some employees with known
drug and alcohol problems the opportunity to remedy their problems
without facing termination.4 '
Nine days after the 1995 union petition was filed, the company
announced that it would lay off nineteen employees. Shortly before

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

138 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1421.
Id. at 1425-26.
Id. at 1423.
Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1421.
Id. at 1425-26.
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these layoffs, several employees overheard the company president
angrily state, "I'm getting rid of the people in the shop. I'm going to
show them who is boss around here. I'm going to show them who they're
fucking with."42
During the election, eighteen employees voted for unionization,
twenty-one voted against, and the Board challenged ten ballots. The
General Counsel for the Board also filed complaints alleging the
employer engaged in numerous unfair labor practices during the union
campaign in an effort to intimidate and retaliate against employees
for
43
exercising their statutory rights to engage in union activities.
The administrative law judge found, and the Board affirmed, the
company violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interrogating employees
about their union sympathies and those of other employees, by threatening employees with plant closures, by soliciting employees to spy on
other employees, and by promising and granting benefits to employees
to dissuade them from union support. However, none of these violations
were at issue on appeal. The Board also found the company violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) by issuing warnings for attendance violations, by
suddenly changing its drug testing policy, and by employee layoffs, all
in retaliation for union activity. The Board's order required the company
to cease and desist from engaging in these unfair labor practices and to
reinstate, with back pay, those employees who were fired pursuant to
the new "zero tolerance" drug testing policy and who were laid off. On
appeal, the company challenged the Board's findings regarding the
layoffs and the drug testing policy."
In its review of the Board's findings regarding the layoffs, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the company's contention that the layoffs could
not have been made in retaliation for union activity because most of the
laid off employees were not known union supporters.45 The court noted

that in order to show a section 8(a)(3) violation, the NLRB General
Counsel must usually show the employee was fired because of union
activity."6 However, the Eleventh Circuit recognized further that the
General Counsel may also succeed under the theory that the employer
ordered general layoffs "'for the purpose of discouraging union activity

42. Id. at 1423.
43. Id. at 1421.
44. Id. at 1421-22.
45. Id. at 1425.
46. Id. at 1423 (citing NLRB v. United Sanitation Serv., Div. of Sanitas Serv. Corp.,
737 F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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or in retaliation against its employees because of the union activities of

some.'

"47

The Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether anti-union animus was the
motivating factor underlying the company's decision to layoff employees
under the Wright Line test.' The Wright Line test, as articulated in
this circuit, requires three phases of proof: (1) the General Counsel must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected activity was
a motivating factor in the employer's decision to fire an employee; (2)
such a showing establishes a section 8(a)(3) violation unless the
employer shows, as an affirmative defense, that it would have fired the
employee for a legitimate reason regardless of the protected activity; and
(3) the General Counsel may offer proof that the employer's affirmative
defense was based on a pretextual reason, which restores the inference
of unlawful motivation.49
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit noted first that motive is a question
of fact and that the Board may rely on circumstantial evidence to infer
anti-union animus.5 ° The Eleventh Circuit continued its examination
of motive by concluding that, based on the other numerous section
8(a)(1) violations, the administrative law judge correctly found that the
real motivation behind the layoffs was anti-union animus.5
Next, the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the administrative law judge's
decision that the company's proffered reason, that the layoffs were for
economic reasons, was merely pretextual."2 Here, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the company's assertion that reversal was warranted in this
case under the decision in Northport," which held the administrative
law judge's failure to properly weigh the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons warranted reversal."
In rejecting this argument by the
company, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Northport from the instant
case because in Northport the court held the administrative law judge
inadequately explained its reasons for rejecting the employer's proffered

47. Id. (quoting Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v. NLRB, 761 F.2d 1175, 1180
(6th Cir. 1985)).
48. Id. at 1424. The court noted that in National LaborRelations Board v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the Supreme Court approved the NLRB's test
for determining motive in discharge tests as set forth in Wright Line, a division of Wright
Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981).
49. 138 F.3d at 1424 (citing Northport Health Serv. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550
(11th Cir. 1992)).

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1424-25.
Id.
961 F.2d 1547.
138 F.3d at 1425.
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legitimate reasons. 5 In sharp contrast, the administrative law judge
in this case considered the company's reasons and then specifically
enumerated his reasons for rejecting them as pretextual.56 Therefore,
under the Wright Line test, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Board's
decision and found the company violated section
8(a)(3) when it laid off
57
employees after the filing of the union petition.
Next, the Eleventh Circuit turned to an examination of the Board's
finding that the company violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) when it
suddenly changed its drug testing policy and discharged eight employees
under the new "zero tolerance" policy.5 Here, the Eleventh Circuit also
upheld the Board's findings. 9
In entering its findings, the Eleventh Circuit said courts, historically,
have acknowledged that an employer's initiation of new workplace rules
or a change in existing rules in retaliation for union activity will violate
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. ° Although the court recognized
employers must be allowed to enforce their disciplinary rules, the court
also said an employer's defense, that a change in disciplinary rules was
nondiscriminatory, will not carry weight when it is shown that the
employer replaced its previously lax enforcement system with a new
strict enforcement policy in retaliation for union activity."1 Also, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that, although not dispositive, the timing of a
policy change may be evidence of anti-union animus.5 2
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit said the fact that the company
changed its drug testing policy shortly after the union filed its 1995
petition, combined with the other evidence of anti-union animus and the
other section 8(a)(1) violations, supported the Board's decision that the
change to "zero tolerance" was part of the company's concerted efforts at
retaliation.' The court emphasized the importance of the fact that the
company failed to produce any evidence that there was a legitimate
business reason for its decision to abolish its former retest policy."

55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id.

58. Id. at 1425-26.
59. Id. at 1426.
60. Id. (citing Gold Coast Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 995 F.2d 257, 267-68 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (canvassing other precedents, holding that initiation of new discipline systems in
retaliation for union activity violates the NLRA)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Perhaps most importantly, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Eldeco, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board," a case strikingly similar in its retaliatory nature to this case,
which found that the implementation of a new drug testing policy during
a union campaign did not violate section 8(a)(1). 6 In Eldeco the
employer began drug testing all new job applicants one week after the
union instituted a strike and filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB. There, a supervisor also had told some of the employees the
purpose of the new policy was to rid the company of union supporters,
not of drug users. Although the court acknowledged that substantial
evidence "facially" supported the inference that the new policy implementation was motivated by retaliation for union activities, the Fourth
Circuit found the drug testing policy supported a valid employer interest
in fighting drug abuse and it had not been disparately enforced.6 7
B.

Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) Unfair Labor PracticesViolations

In National Labor Relations Board v. Triple A Fire Protection, Inc.,8
the Eleventh Circuit first looked at whether the relationship between the
employer and the union had been converted into full section 9(a)
status.69 Because the court did find the relationship had been
converted, the main issue the court examined was whether the
employer's direct dealing and unilateral changes violated sections 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the NLRA.7 °
Triple A Fire Protection installed and maintained sprinkler and fire
protection systems in Mobile, Alabama. At any given time, the highest
number of employees at Triple A was eight employees. From the time
the company was formed, the employees were represented by Road
Sprinkler Fitters Union No. 669. In 1988 the employer signed an
agreement to be bound by the 1988 to 1991 national agreement between
the union and the National Fire Sprinkler Association. In December
1990 the union's business manager sent Triple A a letter expressing the
union's desire to move forward with negotiating another collective
bargaining agreement, to be effective in 1991. This letter included a
warning that if a renewal contract was not reached by March 31, 1991,
then lawful economic action might ensue. Also included were two copies
of an "Assent and Interim Agreement" that would prohibit Triple A from

65.

132 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (4th Cir. 1997).

66. 138 F.3d at 1427.
67. Id. (citing Eldeco, 132 F.3d at 1011-12).
68. 136 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1998).
69. Id. at 734-35.
70. Id. at 735-36.
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negotiating a separate deal with the union and mandate that they
continue to abide by the terms of the expired agreement until the
effective date of the successor agreement. Triple A's president, Turner,
never signed this agreement.71
During the spring of 1991, Turner approached employees on numerous
occasions in an attempt to discuss their employment and the union's
general status. Turner also offered several employees benefits in return
for the employees' promise not to support the union.72
Later that spring, the union representative attempted to set a meeting
with Turner but was put off. Instead, the union representative made a
surprise visit to Triple A, where he found Turner and tried to get him
to sign the interim agreement. Turner refused to sign and informed the
representative that he was submitting his own proposed contract to the
union. Later that week, the union representative wrote Turner and
accused him of refusing to negotiate with the union.73
In April both parties met to begin formal bargaining sessions. At this
meeting, Turner submitted a list of twenty-three jobs that Triple A had
lost in the past year due to high bids based on union wages and benefit
plans. However, there was very little discussion about these figures.
The parties did discuss Triple A's proposed contract and then tentatively
approved a limited number of provisions. Although the meeting lasted
most of the day, very little was accomplished. At the close of the
meeting, the union promised to submit counter-proposals, and a second
meeting was set for April 30. However, neither party mentioned any
deadlines for negotiation.74
Three days later, Turner sent the union a letter accusing it of not
seriously addressing Triple As proposal. The letter also said that,
because the union had failed to submit a meaningful proposal, Triple A
would no longer tolerate the union's inaction. In short, Turner issued
the union an ultimatum saying it would effectuate its proposed contract
if no agreement was reached by April 22. The union representative
responded by confirming the April 30 meeting date. 5
On April 22, Triple A ceased to abide by the terms of the expired
collective bargaining agreement. However, the parties still met on April
30. In this meeting, the union told Turner that Triple As implementation of its proposal on April 22 constituted an unfair labor practice. The
union also told Turner that a section 9(a) relationship existed between

71. Id. at 730-32.

72. Id. at 732.
73. Id. at 732-33.
74. Id. at 733.
75. Id.
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the union and Triple A, which required Triple A to bargain with the
union until the parties reached an impasse or negotiated a new
agreement. Turner then told the union he was willing to bargain until
a new agreement was76reached, but the union representative declined to
bargain the next day.
Although the AUJ found the contract between the union and Triple A
was only a section 8(f) prehire agreement, not a section 9(a) collective
bargaining agreement, the Board reversed and held the agreement was
a collective bargaining agreement under section 9(a) of the NLRA. In
the supplemental decision, the ALJ found that Triple A violated sections
8(a)(1) and (5) when it dealt directly with employees, when it unilaterally reduced wages for bargaining unit employees, and when it unilaterally
stopped making the fringe-benefit payments. The Board affirmed7 and
adopted the ALJ's supplemental decision, and Triple A appealed.
First, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that the
relationship between Triple A and the union had been converted into full
section 9(a) status when Triple A voluntarily recognized the union as
having been designated by the majority of the employees as their
exclusive bargaining representative. 78 Because only eight employees,
including Turner and his son, were involved, Turner would have actually
verified that the clear majority of the employees had designated the
union as their exclusive bargaining representative, as called for by the
voluntary recognition form that Turner signed.79 The Eleventh Circuit
further said the union was entitled to a presumption of full majority
support upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.8 0
Therefore, the parties had a duty to bargain in good faith, and Triple A
also had a duty not to deal directly or to make unilateral changes in
violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5)81
The Eleventh Circuit then moved to an analysis of Triple A's alleged
violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (5).82 The court began its examination
with a look at whether Triple A's direct dealing was a sections 8(a)(1)
and (5) violation.8 3 Because section 8(a)(5) creates an employer duty
to bargain with the incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees, Turner's numerous attempts to deal

76.
77.

Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 734.

78. Id. at 735.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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directly with his employees outside the collective bargaining channels

were per se violations of sections 8(a)(1) and

(5).84

Next, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Triple A's affirmative defenses and
found Triple A's unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of
employment that were subject to negotiation were violations of sections
8(a)(1) and (5).85 First, the Eleventh Circuit refused to accept Triple
Xs argument that the parties had bargained to impasse at the time the
unilateral changes were implemented.86 The court said an impasse
inquiry requires the court to look to (1) the background and relationship
of the parties, (2) their willingness to negotiate, (3) the extent and
frequency of their bargaining, (4) the integrity of the bargaining, and (5)
the good or bad faith of the parties." Under this analytical framework,
the court found there had only been one formal bargaining session and
the negotiations were still in the exploration stage.88 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit held the parties had not bargained to impasse.8 9
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected Triple A's alternative
affirmative defense that an exception to the impasse rule applied
because the union unreasonably delayed or stalled the bargaining
process.9 ° The court acknowledged that, after notifying the union of its
intentions, an employer may make unilateral changes without bargaining to impasse when the union has unreasonably delayed or stalled. 9
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that negotiations had barely
even gotten off the ground and that there was only minimal delay before
Triple A had instituted the unilateral changes.92 The court also was
persuaded by the fact that Triple A instituted the unilateral changes on
April 22, which was prior to the already scheduled April 30 meeting.9 3
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held Triple A did not meet the qualifications
for the unreasonable delay exception to the impasse rule.94
Finally, the court found no merit in Triple A's last affirmative defense
that economic necessity justified the unfair labor practices.9 8 The court

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 738.
Id. (citing Electric Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 958, 963 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 738 (citing NLRB v. Pinkston-Hollar Constr. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 306, 311

(5th Cir. 1992)).

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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said an economic necessity showing requires that extenuating circumstances or compelling business justifications exist. 96 A mere assertion
that the required fringe benefit payments were beyond the company's
financial reach was insufficient.97 In fact, although Turner did present
a list of the jobs lost due to bid price, the parties barely even touched on
the subject in their brief April 9 meeting. Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit held Triple A did not satisfy its burden of showing that its
economic status warranted its decision to implement the unilateral
changes in the terms and conditions of employment."
IV. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

A.

Compensable Overtime Work
In the case of Freeman v. City of Mobile, Alabama, 9 the Eleventh
Circuit examined whether the city of Mobile, Alabama was entitled to a
FLSA section 7(k) exemption"° under which it would not have to pay
officers overtime unless they worked more than eighty-six hours in a
fourteen-day pay period.'' Although a section 7(k) exemption is
narrowly construed against the employer, the Eleventh Circuit held
there was sufficient evidence showing the city was entitled to the FLSA
exemption." °2
Specifically, appellants were patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants
in the Uniform Services Division of the Mobile Police Department
("MPD"). Under Alabama law, the Mobile County Personnel Board has
the authority to establish job classification and compensation plans for
the MPD.'1 8 Consequently, the officers are subject to the Rules and
Regulations adopted by the Personnel Board. However, the officers are
actually employed by the city, which has the power under the Personnel
Board's Rules to choose a work period for its employees.' 04
In 1974 the City Commission adopted Resolution 60-1440, which
established a fourteen-day work period for all members of the MPD. The
Personnel Board later amended its Rules to address "Payment for
Overtime." This amendment provided that all employees who are
nonexempt from the FLSA will be paid overtime for all hours paid in
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97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Id.
Id.
146 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1994).
146 F.3d at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297.
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excess of forty hours per week at one-and-one-half times the employees'
hourly rate, or, in the alternative, the employees will be awarded
compensatory time. However, the Personnel Board failed to specify
which positions it believed to be exempt from the FLSA. Moreover, the
city retained its authority to establish employee pay periods and to set
their work schedules. Under this authority, the city paid its patrol
and lieutenants every other Friday, a fourteen-day
officers, sergeants,
10 5
pay period.
The city's patrol officers were required to report for the roll call ten
minutes before each eight-hour shift. When this time was taken into
account, the patrol officers' regular work schedule was eighty-one hours
and forty minutes for the ten work days in the fourteen-day payroll
period. The city's sergeants and lieutenants were required to not only
devote time to the roll call prior to their eight-hour shifts, but also to
train, supervise, and discipline the patrol officer squads as part of their
regular duties. Consequently, the sergeants and lieutenants worked
over eighty-six hours in the fourteen-day payroll period. Although the
city did pay the patrol officers time-and-a-half for work over eighty-one
hours and forty minutes in a fourteen-day payroll period, the city did not
pay overtime compensation for time devoted to roll call. Not only were
the sergeants and lieutenants not paid overtime for the time spent on
roll call, but they also were not paid any additional compensation for
overtime work." 6
In response to the city's overtime pay policies, a number of the police
officers tried to secure overtime pay for the extra time spent on roll call.
The city's police chief responded by issuing a memorandum saying the
police department payroll period was fourteen days, and the MPD was
not required to pay overtime unless someone worked over eighty-six
hours in that pay period. The memorandum continued by saying that,
because the officers were only scheduled for eighty-one hours and forty
minutes, they were not entitled to overtime pay for roll call. 0 7
The officers filed suit against the city in district court alleging the city
violated their rights to overtime and straight pay under the FLSA. After
the city moved for summary judgment, the officers cross-moved for
summary judgment, asserting the city did not qualify for the section 7(k)
exemption because it failed to affirmatively and expressly adopt a
section 7(k) plan. The district court entered summary judgment for° the
city and found the. city was entitled to the section 7(k) exemption.'0

105. Id. at 1294-95.
106. Id. at 1295.
107. Id.

108. Id. at 1295-96.
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The Eleventh Circuit first examined the language of the section 7(k)
exemption which states:
no public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this
section with respect to the employment of ... any employee in law
enforcement... if... (2) in the case of such employee to whom a work
period of at least seven but less than twenty-eight days applies, in his
work period the employee receives for tours of duty which in the
aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio to the
number of consecutive days in his work period as 216 hours... bears
to twenty-eight days, compensation at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed. 1°9

Based on this language, the Eleventh Circuit said that if a city adopts
a work period from seven to twenty-eight days for its officers, the city
may require the officers to work over forty hours per week without
having to pay overtime. n So, a city need not pay overtime unless an
employee works in excess of eighty-six hours in the fourteen-day pay
period."'
The Eleventh Circuit noted the city was required to show by clear and
affirmative evidence that it has adopted a work period of between seven
and twenty-eight days." 2 Then, the court rejected the officers' allegation that, following this evidentiary rule, the city did not take affirmative and express action to adopt a section 7(k) compensation plan." 3
Instead, the court held that it was sufficient for the city to show through
the resolution, the memorandum, and other circumstantial evidence that
it adopted a fourteen-day work period." 4 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
held the city was entitled to the section 7(k) exemption and, as a
consequence, was not required to pay overtime compensation to any of
the patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants for up to eighty-six hours
of work in any fourteen-day work period."'
B.

Jurors

The case of Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County,"6 examined
whether the relationship between jurors and the county is an employ-
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Id. at 1297 (citing Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 804 (11th Cir.
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ment relationship covered by FLSA." ' The Eleventh Circuit determined the relationship was not an employment relationship covered by
the FLSA, and, thus, the juror was not entitled to be paid minimum
wage under the FLSA for her jury service." 8
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Dade County was indisputably an
employer under the FLSA definition." 9 To determine whether an
employment relationship then existed between the county and the juror,
the court turned to an examination of the economic reality of all of the
circumstances. 120
The Eleventh Circuit said jurors are easily distinguished from other
county employees for several reasons. 121 Jurors do not apply for
employment and are not interviewed to see who is better qualified for
the position.'2 2 Rather, jurors are randomly selected, and all available
persons are summoned."2 Jurors are compelled to serve.'2 4 They do
not receive a salary, but are paid a statutorily mandated sum no matter
how many hours they work. 125 Jurors are not eligible for any of the
employee benefits. 12 Finally, the county cannot fire jurors. 127 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit held there were no indications that the county had
an employment relationship with jurors under the FLSA.' 2
V.

A.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

Preemption

In Hall v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama,29 the insured sued
the insurer of an employer-provided health benefit plan, alleging that
agents of the insurer fraudulently induced her to enroll in a particular
plan based upon a material misrepresentation about the scope of
coverage for pre-existing conditions. The issue in this case was whether
the insured's state law fraudulent inducement claim was preempted by

117. Id. at 818-19.
118. Id. at 819.
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ERISA 3 After careful review, the court of appeals found this state
law claim was preempted. 131
The facts revealed that plaintiff found out she needed surgery for a
pre-existing tumor, and she consulted with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Alabama. The insurer informed her it would deny any insurance claim
arising out of the surgery because the surgery was due to a pre-existing
condition. After plaintiff had the surgery, she filed suit against the
insurer, claiming that agents of Blue Cross fraudulently induced her to
enroll in their plan based upon a material misrepresentation about the
scope of insurance coverage for pre-existing conditions. Plaintiff's state
court complaint against Blue Cross asserted three counts: (1) "fraud in
or around December of 1994"; (2) "suppression"; and (3) "fraud in the
inducement." 3 2 Plaintiff alleged that because of Blue Cross's misrepresentation, "she did not secure other coverage during the 270-day
exclusion period and [she] did not request that Blue Cross modify its
offer so as to cover unknown preexisting conditions."" She sought
compensatory and punitive damages. 1"4
Plaintiff contended her state law claims arose solely out of the state
law fraud doctrine.'35 Blue Cross, however, contended that plaintiff's
claims implicated ERISA allegations and, therefore, ERISA preempted
her state law action."3 6 The Eleventh Circuit started by addressing the
well-established law that a "cause of action does not arise under federal
law unless the plaintiff's 'well-pleaded complaint' presents a federal
question.",3 7 Although plaintiff's complaint allegedly relied on state
law, the Eleventh Circuit found she could not avoid federal jurisdiction
if some of her allegations involved an area of law that the federal
legislation had preempted. 3 ' The court went on to note the United
States Supreme Court had broadly interpreted the phrase "relate to" in
ERISA preemption clauses so as to include any state law claim having
a "'connection with or reference to'" an employee benefits plan.'3 9 The
Eleventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court had stated even more
recently that any and all state law claims will be found to "relate to" an

130. Id. at 1064.
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conduct at issue is
ERISA plan for preemption purposes if the "'alleged
1
benefits.'"'
pay
to
refusal
the
with
intertwined
Interestingly enough, plaintiff tried to argue her fraudulent inducement claim really arose out of the manner in which Blue Cross
"marketed" its insurance policies, and, therefore, because ERISA did not
govern the "sale of' insurance, it could not preempt her claim. 141 The
Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that there was no way a jury could
determine whether plaintiff had been fraudulently induced into signing
up with this plan unless they looked to the four corners of the ERISA
governed policy itself.142 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found
plaintiff could not go forward with her state law claims against Blue
Cross because these state law claims were preempted by ERISA. 1"
B. ERISA Common Law
In Horton v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,'" a beneficiary
brought an ERISA action against the insurers, seeking benefits under
her husband's life insurance policy. There was some question as to
whether her husband had committed suicide, but the beneficiary argued
the common-law presumption against suicide, in favor of accidental
death, should be part of ERISA's common-law as well. In fact, the
district court relied upon the legal presumption in deciding this case in
favor of the beneficiary. The defendant-insurer, however, argued on
appeal that the district court erred in using the legal presumption in
determining this claim.'14

First, the Eleventh Circuit noted courts have the authority to "'develop
a body of federal common law to govern issues in ERISA actions not
covered by the act itself.'"' When examining a body of common-law,
the Eleventh Circuit stated the federal courts may look to state law as
a model because of the state's greater experience in interpreting
insurance contracts and resolving coverage disputes. 147 Second, in
deciding whether a particular rule should become a part of ERISA's
common-law, the Eleventh Circuit stated a court must examine whether
14
the rule, if adopted, would further ERISA's schemes and goals.
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Id. (quoting Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th
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Specifically, ERISA has two central goals: (1) protection of the interest
"9
and
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,
150
plans.
benefit
employee
(2) uniformity in the administration of
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that both the negative
presumption against suicide and the affirmative presumption of
accidental death furthered ERISA's goals.' 5' Because these presumptions favor the protection of the interest of the beneficiaries over those
of the insurance company, they meet the fundamental goals of
ERISA."'5 Because the majority of states recognize the presumption
against suicide and in favor of accidental death, the Eleventh Circuit
become a part of the ERISA commonheld this presumption could also
53
Circuit.
Eleventh
the
in
law
VI.

CONCLUSION

As with the surveys conducted in the years past, in 1998 the Eleventh
Circuit continued to be a leader in deciding issues of importance in the
area of traditional labor law. It should be specifically emphasized that
the ERISA area of law is growing rapidly and is becoming a very
specialized area. In fact, an entire article could be dedicated to ERISA
cases over the past year. That said, attorneys who practice in either the
ERISA area of law or the traditional area of labor law need to be very
aware of the continuing developments in this field so as to provide their
clients with the most effective representation possible.
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